Aircraft Accident Brief Ntsb/aab-02/01 (Pb2002-910401): Egypt Air Flight 990, Boeing 767-366er, Su-Gap - National Transportation Safety Board Page 12
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surface continued to move in the nose-up direction, and the right surface reversed its
motion and moved in the nose-down direction.
The FDR data indicated that the engine start lever switches for both engines
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moved from the run to the cutoff position between 0150:21 and 0150:23.
Between 0150:24 and 0150:27, the throttle levers moved from their idle position to full
throttle, the speedbrake handle moved to its fully deployed position, and the left elevator
surface moved from a 3º nose-up to a 1º nose-up position, then back to a 3º nose-up
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position.
During this time, the CVR recorded the captain asking, “What is this? What is
this? Did you shut the engine(s)?” Also, at 0150:26.55, the captain stated, “Get away in
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the engines,”
and, at 0150:28.85, the captain stated, “shut the engines.” At 0150:29.66,
the relief first officer stated, “It’s shut.”
Between 0150:31 and 0150:37, the captain repeatedly stated, “Pull with me.”
However, the FDR data indicated that the elevator surfaces remained in a split condition
(with the left surface commanding nose up and the right surface commanding nose down)
until the FDR and CVR stopped recording at 0150:36.64 and 0150:38.47, respectively.
(The last transponder [secondary radar] return from the accident airplane was received at
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the radar site at Nantucket, Massachusetts, at 0150:34.)
Information about the remainder of the flight came from the airplane’s two debris
fields and recorded primary radar data from long-range radar sites at Riverhead, New
York, and North Truro, Massachusetts, and the short-range radar site at Nantucket. The
height estimates based on primary radar data from the joint use FAA/U.S. Air Force
(USAF) radar sites indicated that the airplane’s descent stopped about 0150:38 and that
the airplane subsequently climbed to about 25,000 feet msl and changed heading from 80º
to 140º before it started a second descent, which continued until the airplane impacted the
ocean.
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The cessation of the FDR and CVR recordings was consistent with the loss of electrical power to the
recorders that resulted from the engines being shut off. Although the FDR recorded different parameters at
different sampling rates and at slightly different times, the last subframe of recorded data was recorded
at 0150:36.64.
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According to calculations based on FDR data, the airplane’s maximum rate of descent was
about 39,000 feet per minute (fpm); this rate was recorded at 0150:19.
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The engine start lever switches control the flow of fuel to the engines and are located on the center
console between the pilot positions. When these levers are moved to the cutoff position, fuel flow to the
engines is stopped, and the engines stop operating within about 5 or 6 seconds. They are spring-loaded,
lever-lock design switches that must be pulled up to release from one detent before they can be moved to the
other position, where they will engage in another detent.
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The Safety Board’s simulator tests demonstrated that an EgyptAir pilot similar in size to the
command captain was able to occupy the captain’s seat without physical interference; brace himself against
the center console or floor structure; readily apply back pressure on the control column; and reach the
throttles, speedbrakes, and other controls on the central console with the seat in its aft position. (The Board
recognizes that the simulations could not duplicate the near 0 G loads recorded by the FDR during the
accident sequence; however, such near 0 G loads were present only momentarily after the recovery started
and should not have substantially affected the fore-and-aft forces either pilot could generate once normally
seated and effectively braced.)
NTSB/AAB-02/01
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