Aircraft Accident Brief Ntsb/aab-02/01 (Pb2002-910401): Egypt Air Flight 990, Boeing 767-366er, Su-Gap - National Transportation Safety Board Page 123
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160 been accomplished. Curiously, at the same time that Boeing refused to conduct any wind tunnel
tests 1 for this accident, it announced on March 15, 2001, that it had just completed wind tunnel
tests on the new Boeing 767-400ER at speeds up to .97 Mach. The tests were completed in
February 2001 at the U.S. Air Force Arnold Engineering Development Center at the Arnold Air
Force Base in Tennessee.
The Egyptian Team repeatedly requested a more detailed spectrum analysis of certain
sounds recorded on the CVR in the period just before the accident event started. This included
the unexplained phrase “Control it.” Chairman Hall, early in the investigation, suggested
bringing in a Russian spectrum analysis expert to assist in this area. Although the NTSB had
used this expert previously, it never sought his services and never explained its decision to the
Egyptian Team. Nevertheless, the Egyptian Team continued to make requests for other spectrum
analysis of CVR voices and sounds that the NTSB refused to undertake. This is contrary to what
is required in a thorough accident investigation -- and is inconsistent with the NTSB’s
procedures in accident investigations where U.S. carriers have been involved.
Other areas where the investigation was incomplete and/or where requests from the
Egyptian Team were not addressed include:
•
There was a perfunctory treatment of the recorded radar data of Flight 990. Only
after the Egyptian Team insisted was there any effort to analyze the radar data. In
addition, the investigation of radar issues was hampered by the absence of certain
critical data. For example, 18 requests were made by the Egyptian Team for
specific radar data and information. To date, eight of the requests have been
refused with the explanation that the data is classified and is not available to the
FAA or to the NTSB investigation. The Egyptian Team complained to U.S.
Government officials that this is contrary to ICAO standards which require that
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Through Boeing meeting with Egyptian Investigation Teem on late May 2001, Boeing presented some limited
wind tunnel test data regarding aileron and elevator.
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