Aircraft Accident Brief Ntsb/aab-02/01 (Pb2002-910401): Egypt Air Flight 990, Boeing 767-366er, Su-Gap - National Transportation Safety Board Page 138
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160 that the RFO was trying to make others leave the cockpit. More important, however, is that the
NTSB report does not reflect that at the time the RFO asked that the pen be returned, the CFO
was still in the cockpit, and that he was still present at 0147:03 -- seven minutes after he agreed
to change seats with the RFO.
The draft report fails to point out that the RFO never asked the CFO or anyone else to
leave the cockpit. In fact, the transcript identifies a number of different voices in the cockpit and
numerous times when the cockpit door is “operating,” suggesting that there was substantial
traffic in and out of the cockpit. Consequently, it would have been extremely difficult for a crew
member seeking to be alone to be sure that would occur when others were so freely -- and
frequently -- present in the cockpit. Further, there is no evidence even if the RFO were alone --
as the NTSB contends -- that he took any action, such as locking the door, to prevent other
crewmembers from entering the cockpit.
These facts neither reflected in nor commented upon in the draft report present a picture
of a busy cockpit with people coming and going in response to their own desires and not as part
of the RFO’s coordinated plan.
2.
(Page 5, footnote 10) The meaning of “Tawakkalt ala Allah” is critical to the
investigation. The Egyptian Team presented a substantial report about the cultural and religious
meanings of this statement, and specifically made the point that this statement would never be
used by a person who was about to do an evil deed. This aspect of the CVR and the cultural
basis for the explanation of the actions of the RFO were generally ignored in the draft report.
The NTSB should include in its report the cultural evidence regarding the circumstances when
this expression would and would not be used.
3.
(Pages 6-10) This section of the draft report addresses the actions of the RFO and
the Captain and the manner in which the airplane maneuvered up until the end of the CVR and
FDR recordings. The section is replete with the selective use of FDR data and CVR statements.
The following points either are not raised or are minimized:
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