Aircraft Accident Brief Ntsb/aab-02/01 (Pb2002-910401): Egypt Air Flight 990, Boeing 767-366er, Su-Gap - National Transportation Safety Board Page 151
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160 inattention. It is neither acceptable nor explainable that an ATC controller does not notice the
disappearance of an aircraft for more than four minutes after the last possible transponder radar
return -- particularly when there are only a few airplanes in the air.
28.
(Page 60) The analysis does not address in any way the reports of unexplained
movements of the control column or the control wheel. These events on the outbound flight are
possibly the reason the RFO disconnected the autopilot on EgyptAir Flight 990.
29.
(Page 60) The discrepancy between the left and right elevators as recorded on the
FDR prior to the event are not cited or analyzed. The position differences are indicative of an
anomaly in the elevator control system and are critical to the analysis of the PCA jam/failure
scenario
30.
(Page 61) This sweeping generalization does not at all address the likelihood or
possibility that the right elevator separated from the airplane about 0150:21. EgyptAir
previously provided the NTSB with detailed calculations regarding the expected roll rate that
would have occurred if the elevator were attached and in fact split from the left elevator to the
extent indicated on the FDR. The NTSB must explain why the expected roll did not occur.
31.
(Pages 62-63) The discussion of the recovered PCA’s and the bellcrank
assemblies provides no in-depth analysis or a description of the anomalies that have been
documented. The Board again fails to note that the one PCA from EgyptAir Flight 990 with a
sheared rivet, sheared slid pin and an improperly positioned coil spring is the only PCA ever
examined by the NTSB with any observable anomalies. The NTSB’s analysis does not address
the shear patterns of the recovered elevator bellcrank assemblies except to attribute them in
general to “high speed water impact and under water recovery.” There are no facts in the docket
to support, much less prove, this conclusion. This analysis is inadequate and speculative and,
more importantly, appears intended solely to support the deliberate act scenario.
Further, the analysis completely avoids any discussion of the NTSB’s statement on page
39 that the internal anomalies of the right elevator PCA “might or might not have been impact-
related.” If those anomalies were not impact-related, then they indicate a serious problem in
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