Aircraft Accident Brief Ntsb/aab-02/01 (Pb2002-910401): Egypt Air Flight 990, Boeing 767-366er, Su-Gap - National Transportation Safety Board Page 158
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160 It is readily apparent from a comparison of Flight 990 data with that from Silk Air that
the NTSB has manipulated the facts and corresponding analysis to fit its predetermined result. In
Silk Air, the NTSB wrote that “physical evidence of a high engine power setting, a horizontal
stabilizer trim setting positioned for maximum nose-down attitude, and the absence of any
indication of an attempt to reduce the airplane’s speed … strongly suggest the [diving] maneuver
was intentional.” In the case of Flight 990 where all of these factors are the opposite of those in
Silk Air -- where the engines were throttled back to a low power setting, less than full elevator
authority was used, there was no nose-down stabilizer trim, and various steps, including
extended the speed brakes, were taken to reduce speed -- the NTSB still concludes it was an
intentional act. It is impossible to believe that the NTSB conducted an objective and unbiased
investigation of Flight 990 when it is plain that completely opposite data concerning key factors
in two accidents, nevertheless, produced the same NTSB conclusion.
41.
(Page 74) The NTSB makes several speculative statements without explanation
or support. The NTSB hypothesis that the RFO was gripping the control column when he
supplied “significant nose-down control column inputs” and that action also provided some input
to the ailerons. First, the FDR does not record either control column movement or the forces
exerted; consequently, control column movement is only implied from other parameters. There
is no FDR data that confirms what action was taken by the RFO. Second, input to the ailerons
could also be supplied when pulling on the control column in response to a dual PCA jam.
The NTSB also states that the RFO increased forward pressure on the control column
“when he heard the captain returning to the cockpit.” This statement demonstrates that the
NTSB’s intention to avoid an objective evaluation of all of the evidence extends to making up
evidence. There is no evidence whatsoever that the RFO heard the Captain returning to the
cockpit. The only reason to include this fabricated claim is to place the blame for the accident on
the RFO and to provide an explanation for an event that the NTSB finds otherwise
unexplainable.
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