Aircraft Accident Brief Ntsb/aab-02/01 (Pb2002-910401): Egypt Air Flight 990, Boeing 767-366er, Su-Gap - National Transportation Safety Board Page 52
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160 46
scenarios, full recovery was possible even when no efforts were made to recover the
airplane until 20 seconds after the failure occurred. Although additional force beyond that
required for recovery from a dive of this magnitude without a failure was necessary in all
tested scenarios, the nonfailed surface responded immediately to nose-up inputs and
recovery could be accomplished by a single pilot using either the left or right control
column. Although the recovery was easier and the required control column force was
reduced when stabilizer trim was used, it was not necessary to use stabilizer trim to
recover from any of the three failure scenarios. Further, the simulations also demonstrated
that the engines could have been restarted throughout most (if not all) of the recovery from
the dive and/or the subsequent climb and that the airplane could have been returned to
straight and level flight after the recorders stopped recording. The elevator deflections
resulting from the fourth scenario were less extreme, and would therefore be easier to
recover from, than those resulting from the first three failure scenarios.
Additional Information
Submissions
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The Safety Board received submissions from EgyptAir,
Boeing, and P&W.
(Note: The fourth failure scenario [a cable jam with a break of the same cable] was studied
after these submissions were received; therefore, these submissions do not reference this
scenario.)
EgyptAir’s April 28, 2000, Presentation
During EgyptAir’s April 28, 2000, presentation to the Safety Board, its
representatives stated, in part, the following:
•
The suicide scenario is not consistent with data and facts of [the EgyptAir
flight 990] accident.
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For additional information, see Systems Group Chairman’s Factual Report and its addendum
regarding the ground and simulation testing.
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EgyptAir provided the Safety Board with a presentation and several documents and letters that
documented its position, including the following: a presentation, dated April 28, 2000; a formal submission,
dated August 11, 2000; and a document, dated January 12, 2001, titled, “Response of EgyptAir to
October 31, 2000, Submission of The Boeing Company Regarding the EgyptAir Flight 990 Investigation.”
These documents and letters are available in the public docket for this accident.
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The Egyptian Government also provided the Safety Board with additional documents, including the
following: (1) the Egyptian Government’s comments regarding the Board’s draft report of this accident,
(2) the Egyptian Government’s own report regarding this accident, and (3) the Egyptian Government’s
addendum to its report regarding this accident. Although these documents are not submissions, and therefore
are not discussed in this section, they are available for review. The Egyptian Government’s comments
regarding the Board’s draft report are attached to this report, and the Egyptian Government’s accident report
and its addendum are available in the public docket for this accident.
NTSB/AAB-02/01
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