District Court City And County Of Denver Colorado Order (Page 3 of 3) in pdf

determination. In Lujan, the Colorado Supreme Court refused to make policy decisions

regarding adequacy of educational expenditures, stating: “Judicial intrusion to weigh

such considerations and achieve such goals must be avoided.” Id. at 1018. The current

financing scheme is in accord with the minimum mandates of Amendment 23, does not

pose a constitutional question, and is therefore non-justiciable. The Defendants reliance

on Colorado General Assembly v. Lamm, 700 P.2d 508, 520 (Colo. 1985) is well

founded. In Lamm, the Court held that, “the General Assembly’s absolute power over

appropriations includes not only determinations of which projects to support with

funding, but also the level of funding for each project.”

Plaintiffs’ third claim for relief attempts to restructure the historical framework of

Colorado public education by arguing that school tax levies are in fact state taxes subject

to the uniformity requirement of Article I, §3(1)(a). In Lujan v. Colorado State Board of

Education, 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982), the court relied heavily on the Colorado

philosophy of local control, holding that the apparent objective of the Colorado system of

financing public education is local control. Id. at 1022. The Lujan court rejected a

constitutional challenge to the state’s system of public school financing, explaining,

“taxation of local property has not only been the primary means of funding local

education, but also of ensuring that the local citizenry direct the business of providing

public school education in their school district.” Id. at 1021. Meeting the uniformity

requirements of Article I, § 3(1)(a) at the local level would not only take power away

from local authorities, it would impair the ability of local districts to efficiently manage

local schools. Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is warranted.

Lastly, Defendants assert that Plaintiff school districts, as political subdivisions of

the State, lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Public School Finance

Act of 1994. The Finance Act is a statute that directs the school districts performance

and responsibilities and the Plaintiffs are political subdivisions of the state. Given these

facts, Defendants argue that the rule limiting standing from Denver Ass’n for Retarded

Children, Inc. v. School Dist. No. 1 in City and County of Denver, 188 Colo. 310, 535

P.2d 200 (Colo. 1975) applies. This court agrees. Accordingly, Plaintiff school districts

lack standing to prosecute the within claims.

Therefore the Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint is granted on

all claims.

DATED THIS ________ DAY OF ________, 2006.

BY THE COURT:

_______________________

Michael A. Martinez

District Court Judge

District Court City And County Of Denver Colorado Order Page 3