Aircraft Accident Brief Ntsb/aab-02/01 (Pb2002-910401): Egypt Air Flight 990, Boeing 767-366er, Su-Gap - National Transportation Safety Board Page 121
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160 interpreted that translation without any cultural information, and then, less than 48 hours after the
recorders were recovered, leaked information and made public statements concerning the CVR.
The NTSB’s actions, unfortunately, resulted in an extraordinary waste of time, effort, and
resources by the Egyptian Team, Boeing, and the NTSB. Instead of participating in an ongoing,
objective investigation, focused on safety issues, the Egyptian Team was constantly forced to
address the false issue of suicide. Despite the accumulation of substantial evidence showing that
the suicide theory was incorrect and that there were serious airworthiness issues related to the
Boeing 767 elevator bellcrank control system, the NTSB continued to make public statements
which denied the existence of any mechanical issues and fueled speculation regarding the so-
called suicide theory. In particular, the NTSB repeatedly asserted that it had found no
mechanical cause for the accident. These statements -- not balanced by any corresponding
comment that no non-mechanical cause had been found -- created a virtually unassailable public
perception that the accident was attributable to the actions of the First Officer. The NTSB’s
actions were consistently contrary to their own procedures and to those contained in Annex 13.
The NTSB’s persistent focus on the deliberate act scenario resulted in less than adequate
investigation plans for other standard parts of the investigation. This was especially evident in
the areas of the Systems Group, Aircraft Performance Group, and the Metallurgical Group. The
Egyptian Team was forced to push for broader investigation plans and expanded tasks and
schedules just to assure that basic aircraft accident issues were addressed. One example of the
NTSB’s failure to pursue basic investigative steps was its refusal to conduct any metallurgical
examination of any elevator bellcrank rivets or power control actuators (PCA) until an Egyptian
Team member, in January 2000, insisted that this be done. The result was a full-scale
metallurgical analysis. The focus on the bellcrank issues and the Boeing inspection procedure,
which the ECAA brought to the FAA’s attention, led to a special investigation by the FAA in
July 2000 and two Airworthiness Directives related to sheared bellcrank rivets and the
inadequate Boeing inspection procedure.
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