Aircraft Accident Brief Ntsb/aab-02/01 (Pb2002-910401): Egypt Air Flight 990, Boeing 767-366er, Su-Gap - National Transportation Safety Board Page 139
ADVERTISEMENT
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
153 
154 
155 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 •
The draft NTSB report does not discuss the important fact that there was no
argument between the Captain and the RFO when the Captain re-entered the
cockpit at 0150:06 after the accident event started. The Captain did not say to the
RFO “What are you doing?” “Why are you pushing the controls of the airplane
forward?” “Let go of the controls.” There is absolutely no indication that the
Captain thought the RFO had any part with the condition of the airplane. None of
this is addressed in the draft report. Instead, the Captain said five times, “What’s
happening?” There is no indication from the Captain’s words that he believed the
RFO was acting improperly.
•
The cockpit door was left open. The RFO would have closed and locked the door
if he had a plan to deliberately place the airplane into a dive.
•
There is no mention of the following FDR data:
−
Only 6 degrees of TED elevator was used even though 15 degrees of TED
elevator were available;
−
The computed control column position was less than 4 degrees forward
although 11 degrees of forward movement was available;
−
Throughout the maneuver, the airplane was never rolled more than 10
degrees, and each time a roll started, it was corrected back toward a wings
level attitude;
•
The engines were not cut off as part of the initial dive;
•
The FDR contains 25 hours of data detailing the airplane’s performance prior to
the accident. In particular, this data shows an unusual pattern of 11 autopilot
disconnects. These autopilot disconnects shed light on the unique behavior of
EgyptAir 990. Of special note is that most of the time the autopilot was
disengaged, there was an obvious downward movement of elevators, with the
right elevator showing a greater deflection than the left.
To analyze this data, EgyptAir test flew another 767 and performed a series of
autopilot disconnects and reviewed the FDR data from those test events. This set
22
ADVERTISEMENT
0 votes
Related Articles
Related forms
Related Categories
Parent category: Legal