Aircraft Accident Brief Ntsb/aab-02/01 (Pb2002-910401): Egypt Air Flight 990, Boeing 767-366er, Su-Gap - National Transportation Safety Board Page 64
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160 58
Nor did the relief first officer exhibit any audible expression of anxiety or surprise
or call for help during the airplane’s initial dive or at any time during the remainder of the
recorded portions of the accident sequence. Further, the relief first officer did not respond
to the captain’s repeated question, “What’s happening?” after the captain returned to the
cockpit. Rather, he continued his calm repetitions of the phrase “I rely on God” (which
began about 74 seconds before the airplane’s dive began) for 2 to 3 seconds, and then
became silent, despite the captain’s repeated requests for information. The absence of any
reaction from the relief first officer (such as anxiety or surprise, a nose-up elevator input to
regain control of the airplane, or a request for assistance) to the airplane’s sudden
departure from cruise flight to a steep descent is not consistent with his encountering an
unexpected mechanical problem. Whereas the captain’s audible alarm and the content of
his statements in reaction to the situation upon returning to the cockpit were consistent
with the reaction of a pilot who has encountered an unexpected flight condition, the
passive behavior of the relief first officer was not.
The primary radar data indicated that the airplane climbed for about 40 seconds
after the FDR stopped recording before it rapidly descended again and impacted the
ocean. Therefore, the relief first officer and captain had about 83 and 69 seconds,
respectively, from the time the airplane began its initial nose-down pitch until it began its
second (final) descent, in which to regain control of the airplane; return it to level flight
and restart the engines; or at least establish the airplane in a gradual, controlled glide while
attempting an engine restart. (If control of the airplane had been regained during this time,
the flight crew would have had several minutes in which to restart the engines.) However,
a successful recovery—although possible—was not accomplished.
In summary, the investigation did not reveal any evidence of a failure condition
within the airplane’s elevator system that would have caused or contributed to the
airplane’s initial pitchover or prevented the flight crew’s successful recovery from the
airplane’s rapid descent. Further, the relief first officer’s reaction was inconsistent with his
having encountered an unexpected airplane anomaly. Therefore, the investigation
determined that neither the nose-down elevator movements nor the failure to recover from
those movements could be explained by a mechanical failure.
Pilot Action Scenario
Simulations showed that certain combinations of pilot inputs could result in
elevator motions consistent with those recorded by the accident airplane’s FDR and a
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flightpath consistent with the FDR and radar data for the accident airplane.
Therefore,
the Safety Board evaluated the actions of the pilots as recorded on the CVR, in the context
of all of the evidence gathered in this investigation, to determine whether pilot action
provided a possible explanation for the accident scenario.
104
For additional information, see Systems Group Chairman’s Factual Report and its appendixes and
addendums, Flight Data Recorder Group Chairman’s Factual Report and its attachments, Cockpit Voice
Recorder Group Chairman’s Factual Report and Sound Spectrum Study, and Aircraft Performance Group
Chairman’s Aircraft Performance Study and its attachments and addendum.
NTSB/AAB-02/01
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