Aircraft Accident Brief Ntsb/aab-02/01 (Pb2002-910401): Egypt Air Flight 990, Boeing 767-366er, Su-Gap - National Transportation Safety Board Page 136
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160 the First Officer. In addition, the NTSB ignores the significance of critical internal PCA
damage, which it admits, “might or might not have been impact-related.”
• The NTSB uses airplane performance data, often supplied by Boeing, and performance
data developed in the Boeing E Cab simulator, to reach conclusions about the
performance of EgyptAir Flight 990 without addressing the proven inaccuracies and
errors in the data. Additionally, the NTSB does not account for the absence of airplane
performance data or characteristics for the flight regime of Flight 990 in the areas above
.91 Mach. The NTSB draft report, nevertheless, reaches specific findings about the
Boeing 767 and Flight 990. The fact that many of these conclusions are either
speculative or are based upon data that has not been validated, supports the view that the
NTSB’s conclusions were predetermined.
• The NTSB downplays and ignores critical safety issues related to the Boeing 767 elevator
system. In part, the draft NTSB report uses its analysis of performance data to discount
the existence of safety deficiencies that were illustrated by the two FAA Airworthiness
Directives related to the Boeing 767 elevator system, while ignoring the ongoing
incidents of failed components in the bellcrank assembly and a recently reported incident
of a jammed elevator on an American Airlines Boeing 767.
As shown in the comments below, because of these general errors and shortcomings, the
NTSB draft report creates a false view of the evidence and an inaccurate determination of
probable cause. The following comments, set forth with reference to the page numbers in the
draft report, must be addressed by the NTSB before the issuance of any final report. Each
comment is separately numbered, with the page numbers of the draft report set forth in
parentheses at the beginning of each comment.
1.
(Pages 3-5) The NTSB’s deliberate act theory is based, in part, on establishing
that the Relief First Officer (RFO) took various unusual means to “clear the cockpit” so that he
alone would be in control of the airplane. The implication in the quoted statements from the
CVR is that the RFO “ordered” the Command First Officer (CFO) out of his seat and off the
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