Aircraft Accident Brief Ntsb/aab-02/01 (Pb2002-910401): Egypt Air Flight 990, Boeing 767-366er, Su-Gap - National Transportation Safety Board Page 144
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160 in the draft report is surprising. This lack of emphasis potentially could be justified if the cause
of the sheared rivet failures were known and had been thoroughly analyzed. However, without
knowing the cause of the failures, the NTSB cannot dismiss the issue as unrelated to the
EgyptAir Flight 990 accident and still expect to maintain high standards of accident investigation
credibility.
12.
(Page 25) This section states that the airplane is controllable with a dual
bellcrank failure. However, there is no discussion of the increased control forces a pilot would
experience or the fact that there is no pilot training for this failure. This information is critical to
a proper analysis of pilot actions.
13.
(Page 30) Speech Pattern Information -- This entire section was developed
without consideration to how a person would react if he were so shocked or ill-prepared by an
unexpected airplane system failure that he reverted to a state of inaction. This behavior has been
documented by the NTSB in the past, but is not accounted for here.
14.
(Page 32) The purportedly “unintelligible” comment was interpreted by some in
the CVR group as “control it.” If “control it” was uttered by a crewmember in response to
observed, unexplained, movement of the control column or the control wheel, it explains both
the comment and the decision to disconnect the autopilot. Again, this comment is not included
or discussed in the draft, especially within the context of the statement of the EgyptAir captain
who observed this activity on the outbound flight.
It is puzzling that the NTSB repeatedly describes this phase as “unintelligible” when five
of the nine CVR Group members were able to understand the words -- with four believing it to
be “control it” and one thinking it was “hydraulic.” In fact, it was only a minority of the group
that found the speech “unintelligible.” In light of these facts, it is wrong for the NTSB to label
the utterance as unintelligible. The comment that these words “might have been an isolated
declaration” of the RFO is sheer speculation. In fact, given the RFO’s reported lack of comfort
using English, it is highly unlikely that he was the speaker.
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